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 Denial of Service (DOS) and (DDOS) Distributed Denial of Service attacks 
have become a major security threat to university campus network security 
since most of the students and teachers prepare online services such as 
enrolment, grading system, library etc. Therefore, the issue of network 
security has become a priority to university campus network management. 
Using online services in university network can be easily compromised. 
However, traditional security mechanisms approach such as Defense-In-
Depth (DID) model is outdated in today’s complex network and DID model 
has been used as a primary cybersecurity defense model in the university 
campus network today. However, university administration should realize 
that Defense-In-Depth (DID) are playing an increasingly limited role in 
DOS/DDoS protection and this paper brings this fact to light. This paper 
presents that the Defense-In-Depth (DID) is not capable of defending 
complex and volatile DOS/DDOS attacks effectively. The test results were 
presented in this study in order to support our claim. The researchers 
established a Defense-In-Depth (DID) Network model at the Central Luzon 
State University and penetrated the Network System using DOS/DDOS 
attack to simulate the real network scenario. This paper also presents the new 
approach Defense-through-deception network security model that improves 
the traditional passive protection by applying deception techniques to them 
that give insights into the limitations posed by the Defense-In-Depth (DID) 
model. Furthermore, this model is designed to prevent an attacker who has 
already entered the network from doing damage. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Today, institutions of higher education are seeing a greater frequency of Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks. Denial of Service (DoS) and (DDOS) Distributed Denial of Service attacks have become a major 
security threat to university campus network since most of the students and teachers prepare online services 
such as enrolment, grading system, library etc. Taking all of these considerations in mind, University 
campuses must place a greater emphasis on developing secure and scalable network model. Campus network 
are of unique interest, as security threats like these can have a major effect on a university’s ability to provide 
the proper services and resources to their stakeholders. The scope of information that is provided through the 
breadth of web properties that universities offer can have serious implications if inaccessible or 
compromised. 
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Most of the Universities, however, only used the Defense-In-Depth (DID) model as a best practice 
[1]-[3]. This model serves as a foundation of protecting a campus network system. This secures a network by 
limiting security gaps and exposure to threats through firewalls, intrusion prevention systems, network anti-
virus protection, and intrusion detection systems. In a sense, Defense-In-Depth (DID) model is the first line 
of defense, protecting your organization’s networks from vulnerabilities, reducing the probability of a breach, 
and giving insight into threat encounters. This technique cannot meet the requirements of the dynamic and 
complex network environment [4]. The limitation is that it only provides a passive protection based on 
known facts and attack mode. They are not capable of defending complex and volatile attacks effectively [5]. 
To achieve a good level of security model, the security model should not only be interested in the 
defense mechanisms, but also must rely on deceptive attackers and must have the initiative to disclose the 
attack when it occurs [6]. A honeypot is a trap that contains valuable information or resources and appears to 
be a part of the network, but it is actually isolated and monitored [6]. It works by misleading attackers into 
believing that it is a real system. These purposes help to detect and collect information about the attacker and 
the source of their attack. Gathering this kind of information is important. By knowing the attack source, 
countermeasures can be improved, and anomalies can be fixed. Generally, such information gathering should 
be done without the attacker’s knowledge. All the gathered information provides an advantage to the 
defending side and can therefore be used to prevent attacks in the future. Furthermore, this study also exposes 
the limitations of passive defense protection by testing the actual DOS/DDOS attack in the target machine. 
This attack was the proof of concept that the traditional Defense-In-Depth model has limitations in protecting 
the network assets in the DOS/DDOS attack [7]. 
To support our claim, the researchers established a real network environment in order to test the 
vulnerability of the traditional Defense-In-Depth (DID) model against DOS/DDOS. The White Box 
penetration testing was also used in this study. The experiment was tested and implemented at Central Luzon 
State University and the researchers used the most common tools and practices that the University have used 
to protect their network. The configuration best practices [8], [9] used by the researchers were adapted from 
linux iptables or any proprietary hardware providers like cisco, untangle, juniper, checkpoint, etc. Raspberry-
pi based honeypots as a decoy are also used in this study. 
 
 
2. DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH MODEL 
According to CISCO Systems, Defense-In-Depth (DID) is a defense mechanism which confronts 
different attack methods through multi-layed network security architecture. The concept originates from 
military principle that it is more difficult to defeat a multi-layered defense system than a single barrier. In a 
computer network, Defense-In-Depth (DID) not only intercepts intruder’s attacks on the network but also 
give more time for a network administrator to inspect and repair the systems, thereby reducing the chance of 
a successful invasion and subsequent impact. 
The Defense-In-Depth (DID) implies embedded layers where an onion can be used as an analogy. 
Using the analogy of the onion you can get a better view what the DID looks like. The onion analogy has a 
various different layers representing different security tactics such as firewall, IPS, IPS, Anti-Virus, Proxy 
and hardened server configuration, etc. If you take the time to analyse the network system today and the 
onion analogy is outdated in today's complex network. Many systems dispersed in different location and 
different external and internal network. It is hard to put an onion layer wrapper in the whole system. Firewall, 
IDS, IPS, Network Antivirus (NAV), Proxy, etc are the major components of DID model. However, Most of 
the IDS/IPS/NAV/Proxy functionalities are now being merged into Next Generation Firewalls (NGFW). 
Because of this, the Next Generation Firewalls is considered as a DID in a modern network environment [8]. 
According to the reports of the CORERO Network Security [10], none of the NGFW vendors address the 
DOS/DDoS problem, indicating the need for a separate dedicated solution for preventing DDoS attacks. In 
Figure 1 shows the Defense-In-Depth New Generation Firewall Model of typical Campus Network Security. 
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Figure 1. Defense-In-Depth new generation firewall model of typical campus network security 
 
 
3. ISSUES IN DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH MODEL 
The researchers conducted a survey in the selected State Universities and Colleges in the 
Philippines. The survey shows that the Firewall, Intrusions Detection System (IDS), Intrusions Protections 
System (IPS), Network-Antivirus (NIDS) are the common elements of the Defense-In-Depth that most of the 
Higher Education Institutions acquires to protect their systems. 93% of the Higher Education Institutions 
believe that firewalls protect their systems in any threat vectors, 53% installed an Intrusions Detection and 
Prevention System and only 53% used a Network AntiVirus as their protection against DOS/DDOS attack.  
According to NETSCOUT Arbor’s 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report,  
“Firewall protection solves an important security problem–unauthorized data access. To do this job 
effectively, enterprise firewalls need to perform stateful packet inspection-maintaining records of all 
connections passing through the firewall. They determine whether a packet is the start of a new 
connection, part of an existing connection or invalid. But as stateful and inline devices, enterprise 
firewalls add to the attack surface and can become DOS/DDoS attack targets. Firewall protection 
has no inherent capability to detect or stop DOS/DDoS attacks because attack vectors use open ports 
and protocols”. As a result, enterprise firewalls are prone to become the first victims of DOS/DDoS 
as their capacity to track connections is exhausted.” 
Over half of respondents had firewalls or IPS devices that experienced a failure or contributed to an 
outage during a DOS/DDoS attack while stateful security devices can play a useful role, they are especially 
vulnerable to state-exhaustion attacks [11]. Even the latest firewalls are susceptible to DOS/DDoS attacks, so 
these issues remain consistent year-on-year. 
 
 
4. DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH PENETRATION TESTING TEST RESULTS 
The Table 1 shows the difference between Attacks and the different network set up. Five set of 
attacks were tested on to three different network, first with a network w/o firewall, second to an online 
network with firewall and lastly to a local area network w/o firewall. Five types of attacks with 5 iterations 
were tested on three networks. Using two way Anova with replication at 5 percent significance level, the data 
shows significant difference in the CPU utilization using different attacks. Figure 2 which shows high cpu 
consumption of the machine attacked by DOS/DDOS also strengthens the claim. Likewise, as seen in Table 
2, there is a significant difference in the cpu utilization on the 3 networks. The interaction between the attacks 
used and the network type is present. It can be inferred that the combination of the 3 attacks show higher cpu 
utilization as compared with other attacks although other attacks show variation s in its effect to cpu 
utilization. With regards to the network security, Network without firewall shows higher cpu utilization as 
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compared with network with firewall. Hence, CPU utilization is affected by the interaction of the attacks 
used and the type of network. 
 
 
Table 1. Anova: Two-Factor with Replication 
SUMMARY W/OFW W/F_WEB W/F_LAN Total 
Attack -L 
    
Count 5 5 5 15 
Sum 494.9 402.5 494 1391.4 
Average 98.98 80.5 98.8 92.76 
Variance 0.352 13.555 0.42 84.62114 
Attack -H 
    
Count 5 5 5 15 
Sum 493.4 413.5 485.7 1392.6 
Average 98.68 82.7 97.14 92.84 
Variance 1.422 21.885 2.608 62.90971 
Attack -J 
    
Count 5 5 5 15 
Sum 481.4 369.2 456 1306.6 
Average 96.28 73.84 91.2 87.10667 
Variance 11.707 32.898 3.175 112.5478 
Attack -N 
    
Count 5 5 5 15 
Sum 496.2 438.3 489.5 1424 
Average 99.24 87.66 97.9 94.93333 
Variance 0.428 16.888 5.865 35.28381 
L J N 
    
Count 5 5 5 15 
Sum 500 500 500 1500 
Average 100 100 100 100 
Variance 0 0 0 0 
Total 
    
Count 25 25 25 
 
Sum 2465.9 2123.5 2425.2 
 
Average 98.636 84.94 97.008 
 




Table 2. ANOVA–Difference in CPU Utilization between Type of Network and Attacks 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Sample (Type of Network) 1292.377 4 323.0941 43.58167 4.15E-17 2.525215102 
Columns (Attacks) 2798.895 2 1399.448 188.7693 1.30E-26 3.150411311 
Interaction 891.3675 8 111.4209 15.0294 7.94E-12 2.096968313 
Within 444.812 60 7.413533 
   Total 5427.451 74 









5. PROPOSED DEFENSE-THROUGH-DECEPTION MODEL 
The test results in Table 1 and 2 in this study exposed the weaknesses of Defense-In-Depth (DID) 
model in defending against the DOS or DDOS attack. A leading computer security expert and a Professor 
from Purdue University, Gene Spafford, reminds us that “we will never have a 100% secure system”. The 
key to understanding and enacting comprehensive Internet security is in covering the bases and doing enough 
to make it difficult to hack you. Attackers look for the most vulnerable marks so the more you protect your 
system, the more likely they are to move on to someone easier to hack. To address this issue, the researchers 
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proposed a Defense-through-Deception Security Model. This model is designed to prevent an attacker who 
has already entered the network from doing damage in the legitimate system. The model uses traps to 
misdirect the attacker and delay or prevent from going deeper into the network system and reaching the 
intended target. If an attacker is spending time and energy breaking into a fake server, the defender is not 
only protecting valuable assets, but also learning about [the attacker's] objectives, tools, tactics and 
procedures. Sun Tzu, also advice, “when your enemy seeks an advantage, lure him further”. "The idea is to 
mask real high-value assets in a sea of fake attack surfaces," said Ori Bach, VP of products and marketing at 
TrapX Security. "By doing so, attackers are disoriented”. The Honeypot was introduced in this model as a 
deception tool to attract the attacker. 
Figure 3 shows the proposed Defense-through-Deception Model for Campus Network Security. The 
proposed solution for protection from DDoS attacks would use a combination of Low-Medium/High 
Interaction Honeypots to protect the network system. In the network topology that is shown in Figure 3, 
explains that there are two potential threat actors (hackers), one comes from the outside (DMZ) and the other 
one is in the inside (LAN) of the Network. This model combines deception capabilities to trap, bait and 
engage the attackers, presenting deception attack surfaces that best match attacker’s activity [7]. This model 
creates a tempting environment for attackers within the campus network. Low Interaction traps were used 
that creates virtual hosts on a network. The hosts can be configured to run arbitrary services, and their 
personality can be adapted so that they appear to be running certain operating systems. The low interaction 
honeypots emulate vulnerabilities rather than presenting real vulnerable systems and therefore the attacker is 
not able to interact with it on all levels [12]. For this reason, they are safer, in that you do not have to worry 
about the actions of the attacker on the system but are less flexible. On the otherhand, high-interaction 
honeypots were also deployed, these traps offer real services or systems rather than virtual hosts to the 
attackers to interact with (for instance HTTP, Telnet, DNS, SSH and FTP), which makes them more risky 
than low interaction honeypots [13]. Furthermore, a low and high Interaction honeypot are designed 
primarily for research and to gather information on the attacker’s identity. This helps to determine whether it 
is an actual person or a bot interacting with the host. The information gathered can also reveal not only 
normal connection information but also session information revealing the procedures, techniques and tactics 





Figure 3. Defense through deception model for campus network security 
 
 
6. DEFENSE-THROUGH-DECEPION MODEL TEST RESULTS 
During the experiements, two honeypots (Low/Medium-High Interaction) were deployed in both the 
DMZ and Local Area Network (LAN) of Campus. As a result of our testing, Table 3 shows the attack 
methods and number of minutes that the attackers consumed attacking a wrong system. The researchers use 
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common DOS tools freely available in the internet. Three (3) DOS attacks have been simulated. In the first 
simulated attack in the honeypot; the Online DOS Attack took 21.88 mins, LAN DOS Attack consumed 
92.33 Mins and Figure 4 shows the sample completed test result screenshot and lastly, High Orbit Ion 
Cannon (HOIC) was also used and this is the common tool used by the group ‘Anonymous’ in taking down 
the website. The test result in HOIC took 26.47 mins before the honeypot has overloaded. This test result 
reveals that once our honeypots have been hacked, this cause a delay on the attacker before the real systems 
will be compromised and it gives an alarm or warning to the Network administrator to prepare for the 
countermeasures and future damage to the real system. 
 
 
Table 3. Attack Methods and Time Consumed by Attacker 
Attack Methods Time Consumed by Attacker 
DOS ATTACK-ONLINE 21.88 Mins 
DOS ATTACK -LAN 92.33 Mins 





Figure 4. DOS attack test result 
 
 
Furthermore, Figure 5 shows the play log of the captured attacker in our honeypot. This log reveals 
that we are dealing with this kind of BOT and the attacker used an automated tool called SSH Mirai Botnet 
[15]. The following code snippets show the worm checking for different files within the system for write 
access and attempting to find a part of the system open for a root exploit. In both • echo -e ’\x47 \x72\x6f 
\x70/’ > //.nippon cat //.nippon rm -f //.nippon • echo -e ’\x47 \x72\x6f \x70/tmp’ > /tmp/.nippon cat 
/tmp/.nippon rm -f /tmp/.nippon show the user trying to deposit a hidden file in file names that start with "." 
and in "tmp" respectively. After the attacker has probed the file, the final "rm command" is used to clean up 
all evidence that the attacker did anything to that file and to the system. 
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The Denial of Service/Distributed Denial of Service (DOS/DDoS) attacks on campus networks 
become increasingly common, university administrators should consider investing in a solution that 
safeguards their networks from these debilitating attacks. However, most of the Universities use the 
traditional solution defense-in-depth model and playing an increasingly limited role in DOS and DDoS 
protection. To address the limitation, the researchers introduced new approach and this approach would not 
stop the DOS/DDOS attack, instead, the approach assumes that a determined attacker will always be able to 
breach the perimeter. Once the perimeter is breached, defense-in-depth strategy employs additional defensive 
layer which is the deception model that is designed to delay the attacker so that an effective response can be 
mounted by bringing additional resources to counter the attacker; Lure the attacker into "trap" where the 
honeypots may be concentrated; Cause an attacker to consume the resources it needs to sustain an attack; and 
lastly, Cause an attacker to disperse their resources over a wide area, making the attack ineffective. In this 
sense, a defender may give up physical space to an attacker in order to gain time to organize defensive 
measures or countermeasures. Once the identity of the attacker is revealed, legal action against the attacker 
must be served. 
This research also reveals that it is impossible to secure our network 100% especially in 
DOS/DDOS attack. This is to recommend to the Higher Education Institutions to consider the effective 
security measure to protect their assets by prioritizing cybersecurity mitigation plan in their organization and 
train personnel that will have a knowledge that is required to perform the job role of a cybersecurity analyst 
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